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This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/15285811311321206. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. government has adopted the view that physical presence is always required to charge foreign companies or persons with substantive violations of § 78dd-3. The Guide does reiterate that, under a conspiracy theory, if any participant in the conspiracy engages in a relevant act in the USA, all the conspiracy's participants may be charged whether they act in the USA or not.
Corrupt intent, knowledge and willfulness
The Guide does not provide new direction on the issues of what constitutes corrupt intent, knowledge, or willfulness. The Guide reminds readers that the FCPA's intent element does not require "successful" bribes or actual receipt of payment by a foreign official. The Guide also states that the payor need not know the identity of the recipient. Concerning the knowledge requirement, the Guide highlights the Second and Fifth Circuits' holdings that the FCPA does not require proof of specific knowledge of the FCPA's elements or knowledge that the conduct violated the FCPA.
On the issue of willfulness, the Guide restates the FCPA's language and legislative history regarding the meaning of "willful blindness," notes that FCPA liability can be imposed not only on those with actual knowledge of wrongdoing but also on those who "purposefully avoid actual knowledge," and briefly summarizes the Second Circuit's ruling in the United States v. Kozeny case, where the definition of willfulness was at issue [2] . The Guide, however, neither delves deep into the controversies in recent cases regarding the specific nature of "willful blindness" nor reflects that this issue is a complicated -and emerging -one.
Business purpose
The FCPA covers only payments to foreign officials that meet the so-called "business purpose test" -payments must be intended to induce or influence an official to use his or her position "in order to assist […] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." Enforcement actions have shown that the government considers this test to be expansive. Reflective of that position are the examples listed in the Guide, which include influencing the procurement process, evading taxes or penalties, and obtaining exceptions to regulations. And, indeed, courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in the Kay decision, cited in the Guide, have also interpreted this requirement broadly. The Guide, however, glosses over Kay's nuanced holding [3] . In Kay, the Fifth Circuit found that the FCPA could apply to bribes to evade customs duties and sales taxes but only if the government could show that the bribery was intended to produce an effect that would assist in obtaining or retaining business [4] . The FCPA's business purpose limitation, as recognized by Kay, is still very much alive despite the government's (unsurprisingly) expansive position set forth in the Guide.
Gifts, travel and entertainment expenses
The provision of gifts, travel, and entertainment to government officials is a perennial concern for businesses; the Guide attempts to draw some useful lines between permitted conduct and conduct that may violate the FCPA. The Guide notes that there is no minimum threshold amount for corrupt gifts or payments and cautions that "what might be considered a modest 3 This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/15285811311321206. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. payment in the United States could be a larger and much more significant amount in a foreign country" [5] .
The Guide distinguishes minor travel and entertainment expenses from other gifts and payments that would evidence a corrupt intent to influence an official, and it attempts to provide some reassurance that reasonable expenses would not likely violate the FCPA. The Guide notes that "cups of coffee, taxi fare, or company promotional items of nominal value" are unlikely to demonstrate corrupt intent [6] . Moreover, the Guide states that: "[i]tems of nominal value" such as "reasonable meals and entertainment expenses, or company promotional items, are unlikely to improperly influence an official, and as a result, are not, without more, items that have resulted in enforcement action by DOJ or SEC" [7] . Efforts in the Guide to reassure readers that the government is not focused on de minimis items are helpful, but some ambiguity remains in the government's position. The Guide points out that the government has "focused on small payments and gifts only when they comprise part of a systemic or long-standing course of conduct that evidences a scheme to corruptly pay foreign officials to obtain or retain business" [5] . It is unclear whether the government would consider pursuing a long-standing or systemic practice of making small payments to one individual (which might arguably suggest a corrupt relationship with that official) or a long-standing or systemic practice of making small payments to various individuals (for which it is harder to see corrupt intent or effect).
The Guide provides examples of "larger or more extravagant" gifts, travel and entertainment that are more likely to demonstrate corrupt intent. For example, the Guide cites impermissible scenarios in which government officials were paid $500 to $1000 per diems in addition to meal, lodging, and transportation expenses on primarily sightseeing trips [8] . In contrast, the Guide describes as permissible a bar tab for a dozen current and prospective customers (including government customers), a crystal vase for a wedding gift, and moderately priced entertainment expenses (such as baseball and theater tickets) on a legitimate training trip. These are distinguished from an all-expenses-paid trip to Las Vegas for executives and spouses without any business purpose [9] .
Several themes reoccur throughout the Guide's section on gifts and other items of value. First, expenses must be "reasonable." In evaluating an expenditure, it is useful to consider how an expense might be perceived by an outside observer. Second, companies can reduce risk by maintaining accurate, detailed records and implementing an effective compliance program. According to the Guide, an "effective compliance program" should have "clear and easily accessible guidelines and processes in place for gift-giving" [8] . The Guide lists safeguards compiled from Opinion Releases that will assist companies in evaluating expenditures, such as paying travel costs directly to the vendor and ensuring the expenditures are transparent, both within the company and to the foreign government. In addition, entertainment should generally be only a small component of expenses for business trips.
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Interestingly, the government suggests that gifts should be provided "only" where "appropriate" under local law [10] . This appears to be a different standard than what is required under the FCPA's affirmative defense for conduct that is lawful under the written laws of the relevant country. It is unclear what the Guide means by "appropriate" under local law (not expressly prohibited? not prohibited to give? not prohibited to receive? customary?). Moreover, it is unclear why the FCPA analysis would require an analysis of foreign law, an approach that is expressly not taken by the government in connection with other aspects of the statute (for example, a payment can qualify for the FCPA's facilitating payment exception even if it is not permitted under local law).
Charitable contributions
Although the FCPA permits legitimate charitable contributions, charitable giving may run afoul of the FCPA when it is merely a pretext for concealing bribes. The Guide suggests a series of due diligence measures and controls, many of which are familiar from well-known enforcement actions and Opinion Releases, as well as five questions to consider in evaluating proposed charitable contributions in foreign countries:
What is the purpose of the payment? 2.
Is the payment consistent with the company's internal guidelines on charitable giving? 3.
Is the payment at the request of a foreign official? 4.
Is a foreign official associated with the charity and, if so, can the foreign official make decisions regarding your business in that country? 5.
Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits[11]?
Definitions of foreign officials and instrumentalities
Not surprisingly, the Guide does not resolve the numerous issues related to the definition of who is a "foreign official" and what is an "instrumentality" of a foreign government, such that its employees might be considered "foreign officials" under the FCPA.
The Guide fails to provide the bright line definition of state-owned entities that some commentators had hoped to see. Instead, perhaps not surprisingly, the Guide, reflecting recent case law, notes that whether a specific entity is an instrumentality "requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity's ownership, control, status, and function" [12] . The Guide helpfully notes that generally "as a practical matter, an entity is unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares" [13] . However, the Guide goes on to explain that entities in which a foreign government owns or controls less than a 50 percent stake may yet qualify as an instrumentality where the government has "substantial control" over the company. As an example, the Guide refers to a settled case, where despite having only a minority ownership in a telecommunications company, the Malaysian government held "special shareholder" status, "had veto power over all major expenditures," "controlled important operational decisions," and most of the senior officers of the company were political appointees of the government [13] .
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The Guide also notes that "[c]ompanies also may violate the FCPA if they give payments or gifts to third parties, like an official's family members, as an indirect way of corruptly influencing a foreign official," and cites the Liebo case, where personal bills and airline tickets were provided to a foreign official's cousin and close friend [14] . This application of the FCPA to situations where the benefit is given directly to the official's friends or family rather than to the official, is arguably an extension of the FCPA beyond its statutory language, which requires that the item of value be given directly or indirectly to a foreign official.
Third parties
The Guide touches lightly on the issue of third parties, which is a key risk area for most companies doing business overseas. The Guide recognizes that many companies engage local individuals or companies to help them conduct business in foreign countries and that many of these third parties may "provide entirely legitimate advice" and "may help facilitate business transactions." However, the Guide notes that engaging third parties presents certain risks because, under the FCPA, a company may violate the law even without specific knowledge of a corrupt payment when a company is aware of a high probability that a corrupt payment may be made. The Guide enumerates common red flags for third-party transactions, such as unreasonably large discounts to third-party distributors, vaguely described services in consulting agreements, the third party's relation or close association to a foreign official, the fact that the third party is an offshore shell corporation, and the third party's request for payments to offshore accounts.
Facilitating payments
The Guide does not provide much new direction on facilitating payments but restates the existing law in this area, emphasizing that the FCPA's facilitating payments exception is only available "when a payment is made to further 'routine governmental action' that involves nondiscretionary acts" and hinges on a payment's purpose [15] . Notably, the Guide states that "[w]hether a payment falls within the exception is not dependent on the size of the payment, though size can be telling, as a large payment is more suggestive of a corrupt intent to influence a non-routine governmental action" [16] . The Guide provides examples of "routine governmental action," which mirror those codified in the FCPA itself. In a hypothetical, the Guide distinguishes between a payment to ensure permit applications are stamped and processed and a payment to obtain approval for a permit that required the exercise of an official's discretion. The Guide also notes that improperly recording facilitating payments may violate the FCPA's books and records provision.
Interestingly, while the Guide notes that the FCPA still permits genuine facilitating payments, the Guide also points to the OECD's Working Group on Bribery's recommendation that all countries discourage facilitating payments. The Guide also notes that facilitating payments may violate local law and other countries' foreign bribery statutes, such as the UK Bribery Act, which does not contain an exception for facilitating payments.
Extortion/duress 6
In a welcome development, the Guide clarifies the government's position on payments made under threat of extortion and duress. The Guide acknowledges that " [b] usinesses operating in high-risk countries may face real threats of violence or harm to their employees, and payments made in response to imminent threats to health or safety do not violate the FCPA" [17] . Citing a New York federal district court decision, the Guide distinguishes such situations from those involving "[m]ere economic coercion," which do not constitute extortion of the kind that would vitiate the corruptness element under the Act[18].
Many corporate policies address the extortion/duress, or "life and limb" concept, in the context of facilitation payments. The Guide -appropriately -treats this concept in a separate section, making clear that the two are not necessarily related. The Guide notes that a payment made under duress -for example, under an imminent threat of physical harm -cannot be said to have been made with corrupt intent under such circumstances. The amount of the payment, or whether the government official is acting with discretionary authority, is not necessarily relevant to that analysis.
Successor liability
The Guide offers useful guidance regarding successor liability in the context of mergers and acquisitions and the hypothetical scenarios in this section are among the most extensive in the Guide. In summarizing commonalities among transactions in which enforcement officials declined to take action, they emphasize voluntary disclosure, remediation of corrupt conduct, and cooperation with the government. In contrast, an enforcement action against a successor company is likely in cases involving "egregious and sustained violations" or a successor's direct participation in or failure to stop post-acquisition misconduct [19] .
The Guide provides clearer direction on the government's views as to how it treats preacquisition conduct. This topic has generated much discussion in the business world, with numerous commentators suggesting that the government has overreached and charged corporate buyers for conduct committed by target companies. These comments at times have seemed at odds with the actual approach in these cases. A buyer may suffer the consequences of acquiring an asset that is saddled with pre-existing liability, but the Guide generally distinguishes pre-close conduct (which, under general corporate law principles may still exist and be chargeable against a company irrespective of that company being purchased by another company) from post-close conduct (for which a buyer might be charged, if the buyer has the requisite knowledge of, or participates in, that conduct or allows it to continue post-close). The Guide states that in most cases, DOJ and the SEC "have pursued enforcement actions against the predecessor company (rather than the acquiring company)" [20] . This is consistent with our experience representing companies in the M&A context. All that said, at one point in a parenthetical in an example in the Guide, the government says that in "unusual circumstances" it might be appropriate to charge an acquirer with the pre-acquisition conduct of an acquired company [21] . The Guide does not specify what those circumstances might be.
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The Guide outlines several risk-based due diligence procedures that will aid companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions [22] . The Guide acknowledges that pre-acquisition due diligence may not be possible in certain circumstances and that even extensive due diligence may not uncover corruption. In such circumstances, the key actions by the successor that will decrease the likelihood of an enforcement action are "voluntary disclosure, appropriate due diligence, […] implementation of an effective compliance program" and cessation and remediation of the offending conduct[23].
FCPA's accounting provisions
The Guide addresses the applicability of the accounting provisions to publicly traded companies (i.e. "issuers" are required to maintain accurate books and records and internal accounting controls), while also demarcating DOJ's and the SEC's expansive interpretation of the provisions.
As a threshold matter, the Guide reminds readers that the accounting provisions are not tethered to the anti-bribery provisions on two critical fronts. First, accurate books and records and internal controls extend to a range of corporate activities beyond foreign governmental bribery -the Guide specifically refers to commercial bribery, financial fraud, and employee embezzlement. Second, as for foreign governmental bribery, the Guide makes clear that, where appropriate, DOJ and the SEC will (and indeed have) charged violations of the accounting provisions when the anti-bribery provision's jurisdictional and other statutory elements are lacking.
Further underscoring DOJ's and the SEC's enforcement priorities, the Guide clearly signals that both agencies will continue to aggressively enforce the accounting provisions against officers and employees of issuers, as well as against subsidiaries and affiliates of issuers whose financial statements are consolidated with an issuer's books and records. To this end, the Guide details at length the menu from which DOJ and the SEC can pursue such charges, including under a mouthful of theories such as conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, control-person liability, filing false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, failing to properly disclose material information in SEC filings, misleading internal auditors, and circumventing internal controls.
The Guide recognizes that proportionality principles undergird the accounting provisions, such that books and records need only reasonably reflect the disposition of corporate assets and that internal controls systems should be designed to fit the circumstances and risks of particular companies. For example, the Guide specifically states that a financial services company's internal controls may differ from a manufacturing company's. While we applaud this recognition, the Guide does not offer any concrete guideposts for companies as to ways in which internal controls might -in DOJ's and the SEC's eyes -reasonably differ based on a company's anti-corruption risk profile. Similarly, the Guide does not extend any assurance, as some had hoped, that well-intentioned and well-structured internal controls system will absolve a company of corporate charges.
